Foreign bank lending and information asymmetries in China
AbstractThis paper considers whether information asymmetries affect the willingness of foreign banks to participate in syndicated loans to corporate borrowers in China. In line with theoretical literature, ownership concentration of the borrowing firm is assumed to influence information asymmetries in the relationship between the borrower and the lender. We analyze how ownership concentration influences the participation of foreign banks in a loan syndicate using a sample of syndicated loans granted to Chinese borrowers in the period 2004-2009 for which we have information on ownership concentration. We observe that greater ownership concentration of the borrowing firm does not positively influence participation of foreign banks in the loan syndicate. Additional estimations using alternative specifications provide similar results. As foreign banks do not react positively to ownership concentration, we conclude that information asymmetries are not exacerbated for foreign banks relative to local banks in China. Moreover, it appears that increased financial leverage discourages foreign bank participation, suggesting that domestic banks are less cautious in their risk management.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition in its series BOFIT Discussion Papers with number 20/2010.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 30 Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bank of Finland, BOFIT, P.O. Box 160, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland
Phone: + 358 10 831 2268
Fax: + 358 10 831 2294
Web page: http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/
More information through EDIRC
bank; foreign investors; information asymmetry; loan; syndication; China;
Other versions of this item:
- Pierre Pessarossi & Christophe J. Godlewski & Laurent Weill, 2011. "Foreign Bank Lending and Information Asymmetries in China," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2011-01, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg (France).
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- P34 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2011-01-03 (Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2011-01-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IFN-2011-01-03 (International Finance)
- NEP-TRA-2011-01-03 (Transition Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Päivi Määttä).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.