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Organized business, political regimes and property rights across the Russian Federation

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Author Info
Pyle, William () (BOFIT)
Abstract

Abstract: This article explores the inter-relationship of collective action within the business community, the nature of the political regime and the security of firms’ property rights. Drawing on a pair of surveys recently administered in Russia, we present evidence that post-communist business associations have begun to coordinate business influence over state actors in a manner that is sensitive to regional politics. A firm’s ability to defend itself from government predation and to shape its institutional environment as well as its propensity to invest in physical capital are strongly related to both its membership in a business association and the level of democratization in its region. Of particular note, the positive effect of association membership on securing property rights increases in less democratic regions. The evidence, that is, suggests that collective action in the business community substitutes for democratic pressure in constraining public officials.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition in its series BOFIT Discussion Papers with number 18/2007.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 29 Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2007_018

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Postal: Bank of Finland, BOFIT, P.O. Box 160, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland
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Related research
Keywords: collective action property rights political institutions business associations

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bischoff, Ivo, 2003. " Determinants of the Increase in the Number of Interest Groups in Western Democracies: Theoretical Considerations and Evidence from 21 OECD Countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(1-2), pages 197-218, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Przeworski, Adam & Limongi, Fernando, 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 51-69, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. " Corruption and Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 97-125, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Clague, Christopher, et al, 1996. " Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 243-76, June.
  5. Campos, Nauro F & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2006. "Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5886, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Pyle, William, 2006. "Resolutions, recoveries and relationships: The evolution of payment disputes in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 317-337, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, Daniel, 2003. "Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 751-773, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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