Bribes and local fiscal autonomy in Russia
AbstractRussian industrial enterprises inherited from the Soviet era a tradition of producing welfare and infrastructure services within the firm, also for outside users. Despite the massive restructuring of the economy that took place since, many firms are still active in service provision. At the same time, opaque fiscal federalism is a problem for municipalities whereas rent extraction by public sector officials is a problem for firms. In this paper we examine whether there is a link between these phenomena. We propose a model on local fiscal incentives, service provision by firms and the municipality-firm relationship in the form of bribes. Using survey data from 404 medium and large industrial enterprises in 40 regions of Russia, we find that the higher the share of own revenues in the local budget, the more likely the firms are to report bribes. In the case of infrastructure services, the data also support the hypothesis that the channel is through service provision: the less fiscal autonomy, the more service provision and the less likely the firms are to report bribes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition in its series BOFIT Discussion Papers with number 12/2007.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 31 May 2007
Date of revision:
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local fiscal incentives; corruption; service provision; Russia; firm survey;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Social Responsibility
- P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2007-06-11 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-06-11 (Regulation)
- NEP-TRA-2007-06-11 (Transition Economics)
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- Leppänen, Simo & Linden, Mikael & Solanko, Laura, 2012. "Firms, public good provision and institutional uncertainty: Evidence from Russia," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 522-530.
- Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Federalism and regionalism in transition countries: A survey," MPRA Paper 29196, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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