Russian banks´ private deposit interest rates and market discipline
AbstractThis paper examines the extent to which the observed diversity of private deposit interest rates in Russia is explained by bank financial indicators. We also test for whether the introduction of the bank deposit insurance scheme in 2005 affected deposit interest rates. Our results suggest market discipline in the Russian banking system involves Russian depositors demanding higher deposit interest rates from banks with risky financial policies. This discipline seems stronger than in developed countries. Our study suggests also that the risks taken by banks increased after introducing the deposit insurance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition in its series BOFIT Discussion Papers with number 2/2007.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 20 Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bank of Finland, BOFIT, P.O. Box 160, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland
Phone: + 358 10 831 2268
Fax: + 358 10 831 2294
Web page: http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/
More information through EDIRC
banking; deposit interest rates; moral hazard; deposit insurance; Russia;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- E53 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Deposit Insurance
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- P34 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2007-02-24 (Banking)
- NEP-IAS-2007-02-24 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2007-02-24 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-TRA-2007-02-24 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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