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Russian banks´ private deposit interest rates and market discipline

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Author Info

  • Peresetsky, A.A.

    ()
    (BOFIT)

  • Karminsky, A.M.

    (BOFIT)

  • Golovan, S.V.

    (BOFIT)

Abstract

This paper examines the extent to which the observed diversity of private deposit interest rates in Russia is explained by bank financial indicators. We also test for whether the introduction of the bank deposit insurance scheme in 2005 affected deposit interest rates. Our results suggest market discipline in the Russian banking system involves Russian depositors demanding higher deposit interest rates from banks with risky financial policies. This discipline seems stronger than in developed countries. Our study suggests also that the risks taken by banks increased after introducing the deposit insurance.

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File URL: http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/tutkimus/tutkimusjulkaisut/dp/Documents/dp0207.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition in its series BOFIT Discussion Papers with number 2/2007.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 20 Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2007_002

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Postal: Bank of Finland, BOFIT, P.O. Box 160, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland
Phone: + 358 10 831 2268
Fax: + 358 10 831 2294
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Web page: http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/
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Keywords: banking; deposit interest rates; moral hazard; deposit insurance; Russia;

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References

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  1. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, 2000. "Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1751, Econometric Society.
  2. Gambacorta, Leonardo, 2008. "How do banks set interest rates?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(5), pages 792-819, July.
  3. Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2001. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(3), pages 1029-1051, 06.
  4. Ioannidou, V. & Dreu, J. de, 2006. "The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on Market Discipline," Discussion Paper 2006-5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Market discipline and deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 375-399, March.
  6. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 1990. "Some evidence on the empirical significance of credit rationing," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 105, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  7. Hannan, Timothy H & Hanweck, Gerald A, 1988. "Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates of Deposit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 203-11, May.
  8. Soest, A.H.O. van & Peresetsky, A. & Karminsky, A.M., 2003. "An Analysis of Ratings of Russian Banks," Discussion Paper 2003-85, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Peresetsky, Anatoly A. & Karminsky, Alexandr A. & Golovan, Sergei V., 2004. "Probability of default models of Russian banks," BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/2004, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  10. Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, 2000. "Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-1999," NBER Working Papers 7715, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Gonzalez, Francisco, 2005. "Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison of bank risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1153-1184, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Fungacova, Zuzana & Solanko, Laura, 2008. "Risk-taking by Russian banks: Do location, ownership and size matter?," BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/2008, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  2. Berger, Allen N. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Korhonen, Iikka & Zhou, Mingming, 2010. "Does diversification increase or decrease bank risk and performance? Evidence on diversification and the risk-return tradeoff in banking," BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2010, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  3. Andrievskaya, Irina & Semenova , Maria, 2013. "Market discipline and the Russian interbank market," BOFIT Discussion Papers 29/2013, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  4. Peresetsky , Anatoly, 2008. "Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance in Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/2008, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.

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