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Lobbying at the local level: Social assets in Russian firms

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Author Info
Juurikkala, Tuuli () (BOFIT)
Lazareva, Olga () (Centre for Economic and Financial Research, Moscow)

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Abstract

IIn the planned economy firms were made responsible for providing their workers with so-cial services, such as housing, day care and medical care. In the transforming Russia of the 1990s, social assets were to be transferred from industrial enterprises to the public sector. The law on divestment provided little more than general principles. Thus, for a period of several years, property rights concerning a major part of social assets, most notably hous-ing, were not properly defined, as transfer decisions were largely left to the local level players. Strikingly, the time when assets were divested varied considerably across firms. In this paper we utilize recent survey data from 404 medium and large industrial enterprises in 40 Russian regions and apply survival data analysis to explore the determinants of dives-titure timing. Our results show that in municipalities with higher shares of own revenues in their budget and thus weaker fiscal incentives, firms used their social assets as leverage to extract budget assistance and other forms of preferential treatment from local authorities. We also find evidence that less competitive firms were using social assets to cushion them-selves from product market competition. At the same time, we do not find any role for lo-cal labor market conditions in the divestment process.

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Paper provided by Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition in its series BOFIT Discussion Papers with number 1/2006.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 13 Apr 2006
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Handle: RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2006_001

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Keywords: housing divestment lobbying firms muncipalities Russia

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Brown, J David & Earle, John S, 2000. "Competition And Firm Performance: Lessons From Russia," CEPR Discussion Papers 2444, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Garel Rhys, 2001. "The Modern Motor Industry," World Economics, World Economics, NTC Economic & Financial Publishing, PO Box 69, Henley-on-Thames, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, RG9 1GB, vol. 2(1), pages 9-29, January. [Downloadable!]
  3. Juurikkala, Tuuli & Lazareva, Olga, 2006. "Non-wage benefits, costs of turnover, and labor attachment: Evidence from Russian firms," BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2006, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. L.M. Freinkman & I. Starodubrovskaya, 1996. "Restructuring of Enterprise Social Assets in Russia: Trends, Problems, Possible Solutions," Working Papers wp96052, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Angelucci, Manuella & Bevan, Alan & Estrin, Saul & Fennema, Julian A & Kuznetsov, Boris & Mangiarotti, Giovanni & Schaffer, Mark E, 2002. "The Determinants of Privatized Enterprise Performance in Russia," CEPR Discussion Papers 3193, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva, 2006. "Non-wage benefits, costs of turnover, and labor attachment: evidence from Russian firms," Working Papers w0062, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
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