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Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia

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Author Info
Claeys, Sophie () (BOFIT)

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Abstract

The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) assumes a wide range of functions not raditional to a central bank. In addition to the daily conduct of monetary policy, it acts as a regulator and supervisor of the banking sector. It is currently overssing the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme and is the main owner of Russia's largest commercial bank, Sberbank. As this additional functions may conflict with the CBR policy objectives, I review how the current design of the CBR deviates from the optimal allocation of regulatory powers within a central bank prescribed in the literature. I then empirically investigate the need for a supervisory body within the CBR. Using a simple Taylor rule framework I find that the CBR does not use its "hands-on" supervisory information to maintain financial stability, but rather to accomodate state-owned banks' balances.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition in its series BOFIT Discussion Papers with number 7/2005.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 08 Jul 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2005_007

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Related research
Keywords: Central Bank; Prudential Regulation and Supervision; Monetary Policy Rules; Russia;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rafael Repullo, 2005. "Liquidity, Risk-Taking, And The Lender Of Last Resort," Working Papers wp2005_0504, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2002. "Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 471-485, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Agencies?," Economics Working Papers 411, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is bank supervision central to central banking?," Working Papers 99-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Glenn D. Rudebusch & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Policy rules for inflation targeting," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Mar.
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  7. Larry Wall & Robert Eisenbeis, 1999. "Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 223-245, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Richard Clarida & Mark Gertler, 1996. "How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 5581, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Charles M. Kahn & João A. C. Santos, 2001. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision," BIS Working Papers 102, Bank for International Settlements. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Peresetsky, Anatoly A. & Karminsky, Alexandr A. & Golovan, Sergei V., 2004. "Probability of default models of Russian banks," BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/2004, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
  11. Abdur Chowdhury, 2003. "Banking Reform In Russia: A Window Of Opportunity?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-601, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  12. Esanov, Akram & Merkl, Christian & Vinhas de Souza, Lúcio, 2004. "Monetary Policy Rules for Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 11/2004, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Morrison, Alan & White, Lucy, 2004. "Is Deposit Insurance A Good Thing, And If So, Who Should Pay for It?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4424, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Mayes, David G., 2005. "Who pays for bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 161-181, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 2002. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1373-1406, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Martin Summer, 2002. "Banking Regulation and Systemic Risk," Working Papers 57, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank). [Downloadable!]
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  18. William Tompson, 2004. "Banking Reform in Russia: Problems and Prospects," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 410, OECD, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  19. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "What should central banks do?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Dec, pages 1-14. [Downloadable!]
  21. Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1998. "Monetary policy rules in practice Some international evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 1033-1067, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Rafael Repullo, 2000. "Who should act as lender of last resort? an incomplete contracts model," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 580-610.
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  23. Demirguc-Kunt, Asl' & Kane, Edward J., 2001. "Depositinsurance around the globe : where does it work?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2679, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  24. Edward S. Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100. [Downloadable!]
  25. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "Prudential Supervision: Why Is It Important and What are the Issues?," NBER Working Papers 7926, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  26. Peersman, Gert & Smets, Frank, 1999. "The Taylor Rule: A Useful Monetary Policy Benchmark for the Euro Area?," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 2(1), pages 85-116, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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