Strategic markets in property rights without price-takers
AbstractCournot-type models of markets in property rights typically feature strategists–acting at a first stage–followed by the move of a non-empty marketclearing competitive fringe. So, which agents can presumably be assigned the price-taking role? When simulating the upcoming medium-sized market for greenhouse gas emissions permits under the Kyoto Protocol, no answer to this question stands out as satisfactory. As an escape, trade is instead construed as a two-stage noncooperative cooperative game in which all agents act on both stages, allowing everyone to be a strategist.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bergen, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 05/05.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 05 Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Institutt for økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/en
More information through EDIRC
Cournot oligopoly; competitive fringe; market games; property rights; emissions trading; Kyoto Protocol.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kjell Erik Lommerud).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.