Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Overtime pay premiums in a unionized oligopoly

Contents:

Author Info

  • Meland, Frode

    ()
    (University of Bergen, Department of Economics)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper studies how a high overtime wage rate and a low labor stock may be used as commitment devices by price-setting firms. We show that high overtime pay premiums may both decrease and increase equilibrium employment. If an employment-oriented union or the firm itself sets the overtime wage, then the overtime wage premium will be high enough to ensure that no overtime is used in equilibrium. If the overtime wage is set by a sufficiently wage-oriented union, however, overtime will be used in equilibrium, and employment is substantially lower. Thus the authorities may be able to increase employment if it can make a union act in a less wage-oriented manner. We show that this can be done by setting a minimum overtime pay premium. Minimum wage regulation could have the opposite effect.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.uib.no/filearchive/22-02.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Bergen, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 22/02.

    as in new window
    Length: 25 pages
    Date of creation: 09 Dec 2002
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:bergec:2002_022

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Institutt for √łkonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway
    Phone: (+47)55589200
    Fax: (+47)55589210
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/en
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Overtime; Bertrand competition; unionization; regulation;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Bauer, Thomas K. & Zimmermann, Klaus F., 1999. "Overtime Work and Overtime Compensation in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 48, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Daniel S. Hamermesh & Stephen J. Trejo, 1997. "The Demand for Hours of Labor: Direct Evidence from California," NBER Working Papers 5973, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Brown, Charles & Gilroy, Curtis & Kohen, Andrew, 1982. "The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment and Unemployment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 487-528, June.
    4. King, Stephen P., 1997. "Oligopoly and overtime," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 149-165, June.
    5. Ehrenberg, Ronald G, 1970. "Absenteeism and the Overtime Decision," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 352-57, June.
    6. Trejo, Stephen J, 1991. "The Effects of Overtime Pay Regulation on Worker Compensation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 719-40, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:bergec:2002_022. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kjell Erik Lommerud).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.