Coordinating Inventive and Innovative Decisions through Markets with Prices: A Experimental Study of Patent Markets with Transparent Prices
AbstractThe patent system makes organized markets in patents with transparent prices possible. Such prices are here investigated as “signals” for inventors and innovators alike of valuable “technology areas”, in an experimental study. They inform decisions of specialized “firms” on allocation of resources for invention given a search space of induced technology values. The traditional hierarchical model of coordinating invention and innovation in a vertically integrated firm is replaced by coordination of these activities among specialized firms through a market with prices. The experimental study builds on a study focusing on price mechanisms with exogenous technology values to a study of an economic environment with “endogenous” technology values. The results suggest that coordination clearly takes place but differs considerably between the institutions and patent validity tested (a 3 x 2 design). As with the price study, demand-side bidding in both dimensions of the linear contract appears to yield the broadest search scope, and thus the best chances for the allocation of resources for invention. Multiple end-states are observed, especially for institutions with less demand-side bidding, indicating imprecise price signals for institutions similar to today’s personal exchange. Coordination with prices appears to increase the dynamic gains of the patent system through price information to reduce or better inform about the risk in investments in new technology.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Jönköping International Business School in its series JIBS Working Papers with number 2010-14.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Jönköping International Business School, P.O. Box 1026, SE-551 11 Jönköping, Sweden
Web page: http://www.jibs.hj.se/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Ullberg, Eskil, 2010. "COORDINATING INVENTIVE AND INNOVATIVE DECISIONS THROUGH MARKETS WITH PRICES: A Experimental Study of Patent Markets with Transparent Prices," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies 231, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
- Eskil Ullberg, 2010. "Coordinating Inventive and Innovative Decisions Through Markets with Prices: An Experimental Study of Patent Markets with Transparent Prices," Working Papers, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science 1018, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Christoph Engel & Marco Kleine, 2013. "Who is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Nov 2013.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Susanne Hansson) or (Stefan Carlstein) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Stefan Carlstein to update the entry or send us the correct address.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.