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The Ultimatum Game Revisited

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  • Tullberg, Jan

    (Dept. of Business Administration, Stockholm School of Economics)

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    Abstract

    The starting point of this article is the result of one ultimatum game experiment - one of many showing a huge deviation from the predictions of micro theory. However, further analysis gives an explanation of subject behavior that deserves to be seen as rational, if assumptions, such as a total secrecy resulting in no effects on reputation, are questioned. Responders' actual behavior can be understood as adjusted to generally realistic reputation effects, and the choices of the Proposers are surprisingly attuned to actual Responder demands. If seen in this light, the subjects seem to understand the situation and behave accordingly.

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    File URL: http://swoba.hhs.se/hastba/papers/hastba1999_002.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Business Administration with number 1999:2.

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    Length: 11 pages
    Date of creation: 29 Apr 1999
    Date of revision: 10 Jan 2002
    Handle: RePEc:hhb:hastba:1999_002

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    Keywords: Ultimatum; buffer; reputation; spite; altruism;

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    1. Marwell, Gerald & Ames, Ruth E., 1981. "Economists free ride, does anyone else? : Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 295-310, June.
    2. Robert H. Frank & Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, 1993. "Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 159-171, Spring.
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