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Two-part pricing under revenue cap regulation

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  • Lantz, Björn

    ()
    (Department of Business Administration, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University)

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    Abstract

    This paper aims at developing the theoretical understanding of revenue capping as a way of regulating monopolistic firms. It is shown that the fact that a standard monopolist regulated by a fixed revenue cap will raise its price above the unregulated monopoly level is robust to two-part pricing. It is also shown that when regulation of a two-part pricing monopolist is based on a hybrid revenue cap defined as a linear function of quantity, it is the slope of the cap that determines its incentives for efficiencient behaviour while the intercept of the cap only affects the profit level of the firm. This also holds if the cap is defined as a hybrid price-revenue cap. The general conclusion of this is that the slope of the hybrid cap needs to be steeper that the slope of the firm’s cost function in order to prevent the incentive to raise price above the unregulated monopoly level.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2606
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Business Administration in its series FE rapport with number 2005-408.

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    Length: 14 pages
    Date of creation: 17 May 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhb:gunwba:2005_408

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Dept of Business Adminstration, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 610, SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden
    Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/fek/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Monopoly regulation; incentive regulation; revenue cap regulation;

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    1. Jamasb, T. & Pollitt, M., 2000. "Benchmarking and regulation: international electricity experience," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 107-130, September.
    2. Crew, Michael A & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1996. "Incentive Regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States: Some Lessons," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 211-25, May.
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