Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Private benefits in corporate control transactions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Poulsen, Thomas

    () (Department of Business Studies, Aarhus School of Business)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper presents an analytical framework from which it can be inferred whether sellers or buyers in corporate control transactions value private benefits highest. I am thus able to suggest an answer to the question: Are blocks of shares traded because the buyer is a more efficient monitor with high security benefits, or because the buyer has high private benefits from the control rights that come with the shares? Using voting rights as the vehicle for private benefits, I find that the selling shareholders in block transactions attach more value to private benefits than the buyers. In tender offer transactions, the answer is that private benefits are insignificant to both sides of the transaction. As an alternative measure of the transaction premium, I calculate the abnormal return premium. This represents the stock market’s valuation of the transaction. I find that the stock market puts a positive premium on the sample transactions. Although this is not confirmed by the regression results, the market therefore expects higher future security benefits. The negative coefficients of relative voting power lend support to this conclusion, but they are not significant. I also find that inside shareholders have a very small effect on these results, but that they do attach more value to private benefits.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://research.asb.dk/fbspretrieve/1356/F-2008-03
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Business Studies in its series Finance Research Group Working Papers with number F-2008-03.

    as in new window
    Length: 42 pages
    Date of creation: 19 Mar 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhb:aarbfi:2008-03

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: The Aarhus School of Business, Fuglesangs Allé 4, DK-8210 Aarhus V, Denmark
    Fax: + 45 86 15 19 43
    Web page: http://www.asb.dk/about/departments/bs.aspx
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Private benefits; security benefits; corporate control; block transactions; tender owners; ownership structure; influence; voting power;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
      • Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
      • La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Dlugos, Jennifer & Fahlenbrach, Rudiger & Gompers, Paul & Metrick, Andrew, 2005. "Large Blocks of Stock: Prevalence, Size, and Measurement," Working Paper Series 2005-9, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    3. Crespi, R. & Rennboog, L., 2003. "Corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK," Discussion Paper 19, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January.
    5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1995. "Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 4788, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. G. William Schwert, 1999. "Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?," NBER Working Papers 7085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Simeon Djankov & Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing," NBER Working Papers 11883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
    9. Stulz, ReneM., 1988. "Managerial control of voting rights : Financing policies and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 25-54, January.
    10. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110.
    11. Nicodano, Giovanna & Sembenelli, Alessandro, 2004. "Private benefits, block transaction premiums and ownership structure," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 227-244.
    12. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance And Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 107-155, February.
    13. Gregor Andrade & Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford, 2001. "New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 103-120, Spring.
    14. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
    15. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351.
    16. Gaspar, Jose-Miguel & Massa, Massimo & Matos, Pedro, 2005. "Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 135-165, April.
    17. Lease, Ronald C & McConnell, John J & Mikkelson, Wayne H, 1984. "The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(4), pages 443-67, October.
    18. Jensen, Michael C, 1988. "Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 21-48, Winter.
    19. Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-48.
    20. Nenova, Tatiana, 2003. "The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 325-351, June.
    21. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1995. "Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 161-85, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhb:aarbfi:2008-03

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helle Vinbaek Stenholt).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.