Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Moral hazard and cash benefits in long-term home care, CHERE Working Paper 2006/12

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bernard van den Berg

    ()
    (Vrije University Amsterdam)

  • Wolter Hassink

Abstract

This paper tests empirically for moral hazard in a system based on demand-side subsidies. In the Netherlands, demand-side subsidies were introduced in 1996. Clients receive a cash benefit to purchase the type of home care (housework, personal care, support with mobility, organisational tasks or social support) they need from the care supplier of their choice (private care provider, regular care agency, commercial care agency or paid informal care provider). Furthermore, they negotiate with the care supplier about price and quantity. Our main findings are the following. 1) The component of the cash benefit a client has no residual claimant on, has a positive impact on the price of care. 2) In contrast, the components of the cash benefit a client has residual claimant on, have no or a negative impact on the price of care. Both results point at the existence of moral hazard in a system of demand-side subsidies.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.chere.uts.edu.au/pdf/wp2006_12.pdf
File Function: First version, November 2006
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CHERE, University of Technology, Sydney in its series Working Papers with number 2006/12.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:her:chewps:2006/12

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Level 4, 645 Harris Street, Ultimo, NSW 2007
Phone: +61 2 9514 9799
Fax: 61 2 9514 4730
Email:
Web page: http://www.chere.uts.edu.au
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Long-term care; cash benefits; consumer directed services; demand-side subsidies; direct payments; moral hazard;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "The Contributions Of The Economics Of Information To Twentieth Century Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1441-1478, November.
  2. Robin McKnight, 2004. "Home Care Reimbursement, Long-term Care Utilization, and Health Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 10414, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Bernard van den Berg & Han Bleichrodt & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2005. "The economic value of informal care: a study of informal caregivers' and patients' willingness to pay and willingness to accept for informal care," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(4), pages 363-376.
  4. Leslie Foster & Randall Brown & Barbara Phillips & Barbara Lepidus Carlson, 2005. "Easing the Burden of Caregiving: The Impact of Consumer Direction of Primary Informal Caregivers in Arkansas," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 4666, Mathematica Policy Research.
  5. Barbara E. Baarsma, 2004. "The Valuation of the IJmeer Nature Reserve using Conjoint Analysis," Others 0404006, EconWPA.
  6. Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459 Elsevier.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:her:chewps:2006/12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Liz Chinchen).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.