Crime Networks with Bargaining and Build Frictions
AbstractHow does the timing, targets and types of anti-crime policies affect a network when criminal retailers search sequentially for wholesalers and crime opportunities? Given the illicit nature of crime, I analyze a non-competitive market where players bargain over the surplus. In such a market, some anti-crime policies distort revenue sharing, reduce matching frictions and increase market activity or crime. As an application, the model provides a new perspective on why the U.S. cocaine market saw rising consumption after the introduction of the “War on Drugs.”
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0813.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.holycross.edu/departments/economics/website/
More information through EDIRC
crime; networks; search; matching;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2008-11-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAW-2008-11-11 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-NET-2008-11-11 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2008-11-11 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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