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Crime Networks with Bargaining and Build Frictions

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Author Info
Bryan Engelhardt () (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)

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Abstract

How does the timing, targets and types of anti-crime policies affect a network when criminal retailers search sequentially for wholesalers and crime opportunities? Given the illicit nature of crime, I analyze a non-competitive market where players bargain over the surplus. In such a market, some anti-crime policies distort revenue sharing, reduce matching frictions and increase market activity or crime. As an application, the model provides a new perspective on why the U.S. cocaine market saw rising consumption after the introduction of the “War on Drugs.”

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File URL: http://www.holycross.edu/departments/economics/RePEc/Engelhardt_CrimeNetworks.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0813.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hcx:wpaper:0813

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Web page: http://www.holycross.edu/departments/economics/website/
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Related research
Keywords: crime; networks; search; matching;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

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