Asymmetric Competition in the Setting of Diesel Excise Taxes in EU Countries
AbstractThis paper tests new implications of the asymmetric tax competition model on diesel excise taxes in the European Union (EU). I extend the standard tax competition model by replacing the unit demand assumption with iso-elastic demand. As a result, not only the level of the equilibrium tax but also the slope of the tax reaction function depends positively on the size of the country. The new implication is testable on panel data in first differences, and it is tested on a panel of 16 European countries. The results provide strong evidence for strategic interaction in the setting of diesel excises and confirm the effect of country size on the response to tax changes in neighboring countries. Strategic interaction between EU countries intensified in the mid 1990s and drove small European countries to set lower diesel tax rates. These results explain why the EU's minimum tax policy has failed to harmonize diesel tax rates across member states.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 1012.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
tax competition; minimum tax; asymmetric regions; diesel excise; European Union;
Other versions of this item:
- László Paizs, 2013. "Asymmetric competition in the setting of diesel excise taxes in EU countries," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 63(4), pages 423-450, December.
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2010-06-26 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2010-06-26 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-EUR-2010-06-26 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-PBE-2010-06-26 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2010-06-26 (Public Finance)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Adrienn Foldi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.