Codes of Good Governance in Hungary
AbstractThe purpose of the paper is to account for the short history of the soft law regulation of corporate conduct on the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE). In theory, voluntary codes of good governance are expected to improve the deficiences of the existing mechanisms of corporate governance. In case of the Hungarian public companies the most important corporate governance problems are those related to the fragile safeguards of the interests of minority shareholders and to the lack of incentives for a much higher degree of transparency and disclosure. It is these two sets of issues on which the present analysis concentrates. The empirical core of the paper assesses the quality of information to be gained from the corporate governance reports of listed companies on the BSE. In order to discover links between the quality of information and firm characteristics we categorized the declarations based on their adequacy and applied binary regression analysis. We found inverse relationship between ownership concentration and the quality of information, while the higher liquidity of shares enhanced the adequacy of declarations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 0818.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Corporate governance; company law; voluntary codes of governance;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- P34 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2008-09-29 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-LAW-2008-09-29 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2008-09-29 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles
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