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A Model Explaining Social and Political Change of Party-states Structural and Dynamic Background of Similarities and Differences in Reproduction, reforms, Collapse and Transformation

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Author Info
Maria Csanadi () (Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences)
Abstract

I shall argue that the Interactive Party-State (IPS) model (Csanádi, 1997) allows us to place the Chinese and Hungarian party-state structure and dynamics into a common framework. This framework sheds light on the structural reasons behind the different functional effects of reforms. This paper is divided into three major parts. In the first section I summarize the structural and dynamic properties of the IPS model. This is followed by arguments raised regarding its general nature, and consequently, the applicability of the model to China based on common structural and operational grounds. Finally, I will reveal that behind the robust common ground, the different structural specifics may give rise to the divergent development paths. The primary focus is theoretical, with empirical examples provided. Consistent empirical analysis based on the model will be a following undertaking.

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Paper provided by Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 0101.

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Length: 75 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2001
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Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:0101

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  1. Yingyi Qian, 1996. "Enterprise reform in China: agency problems and political control," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 4(2), pages 427-447, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Li, David D, 1998. "Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 393-97, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Wildasin, David E., 1997. "Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1843, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Naughton, Barry, 1994. "Chinese Institutional Innovation and Privatization from Below," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 266-70, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives," Working Papers 97042, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. David D. Li, 1998. "Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 130, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jefferson, Gary H, 1998. "China's State Enterprises: Public Goods, Externalities, and Coase," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 428-32, May.
  9. Gordon, Roger H & Li, David Daokui, 1997. "Government Distributional Concerns and Economic Policy During the Transition from Socialism," CEPR Discussion Papers 1662, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bunce, Valerie, 1985. "The empire strikes back: the evolution of the Eastern bloc from a Soviet asset to a Soviet liability," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(01), pages 1-46, December. [Downloadable!]
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