Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Legislative Structure, Incentives, and Informational Lobbying

Contents:

Author Info

  • Morten Bennedsen
  • Sven Feldmann

Abstract

We analyze the incentives for interest groups to lobby the legislature for favorable policy and compare two institutional frameworks, a U.S. Congress-style legislature and a European-style parliament. The results provide a rationale for why lobby groups are more active in the U.S. Congress. The key institutional feature to explain the different behavior of interest groups is that in the congressional system majority coalitions can differ across policy issues and transcend party lines, whereas in a parliamentary system the majority coalition is given for the duration of a government. We show that this flexibility creates an incentive for interest groups to play an active role in the design of policy in the congressional system, while the lack of it dissuades lobbying in a parliamentary system.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/about/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp_99_27.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Eleanor Cartelli)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago in its series Working Papers with number 9927.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:har:wpaper:9927

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637
Phone: 773-702-8400
Email:
Web page: http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: lobbying; legislative structure; coalitions; incentives;

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:har:wpaper:9927. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Eleanor Cartelli) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Eleanor Cartelli to update the entry or send us the correct address.

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.