Alimony Rights and Intrahousehold Allocation of Resources: Evidence from Brazil
AbstractHousehold economic theory has largely relied on the concept of a "unitary" family decision-making model, in which the household can be considered the appropriate unit of decision-making. Exploiting an exogenous extension of alimony rights to cohabiting couples in Brazil, this paper presents robust empirical evidence challenging this assumption. Alimony rights improve women’s outside options, strengthen their negotiating positions, and increase their influence over the allocation of resources within intact partnerships. Econometric results corroborate this reasoning and indicate that more decision power in the hands of women affects both the hours worked by female adults and the pattern of investments in the human capital of children. These findings suggest that models of the family should take intrahousehold heterogeneity in preferences into account.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago in its series Working Papers with number 0505.
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Brazil; resource allocation; alimony; women;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Eleanor Cartelli) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Eleanor Cartelli to update the entry or send us the correct address.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.