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Alternative Flexibilisierungsstrategien der Beschäftigung

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  • Carstensen, Vivian

Abstract

Dieser Beitrag wägt Vorteile und Nachteile verschiedener Flexibilisierungsstrategien ab, die der Stabilisierung des Beschäftigungsniveaus dienen. Insgesamt zeigt sich, daß Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung durch Arbeitszeitkonten alternativen kurzfristig ausgerichteten Anpassungsmechanismen aus Kosten und Nutzenerwägungen heraus überlegen ist. Thematisiert werden Überstunden, Kurzarbeit, Entkoppelung von Arbeits und Betriebszeiten, Kombination von Stamm und Randbelegschaften, temporäre Einstellungen und Freisetzungen sowie Sozialpläne und Vorruhestandsregelungen. Darüber hinaus werden personal und absatzpolitische Maßnahmen diskutiert, die die genannten Instrumente nicht zwangläufig ersetzen, sondern ergänzend zum Einsatz kommen können. Besonders hervorzuheben ist dabei die positive Wirkung qualifikatorischer Flexibilität, die beispielsweise Multiskilling und variierende Arbeitsaufgaben beinhaltet.

Suggested Citation

  • Carstensen, Vivian, 1999. "Alternative Flexibilisierungsstrategien der Beschäftigung," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-229, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    • Handle: RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-229
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    File URL: http://diskussionspapiere.wiwi.uni-hannover.de/pdf_bib/dp-229.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 606-620, September.
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    4. Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 1999. "Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 106-134, February.
    5. Nickell, S J, 1978. "Fixed Costs, Employment and Labour Demand over the Cycle," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 45(180), pages 329-345, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carstensen, Vivian, 2000. "Employment Stability via Annualized Hours Contracts," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-230, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    2. Carstensen, Vivian, 1999. "Beschäftigungssicherung durch Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-228, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nachfrageschwankungen; Beschäftigungsanpassung; Arbeitszeitkonten; Mehrarbeit; Kurzarbeit; Qualifikationsstruktur; Preispolitik;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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