The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core
AbstractFor any TU game and any ranking of players, the set of all preimputations compat- ible with the ranking, equipped with the Lorenz order, is a bounded join semi-lattice. Furthermore the set admits as sublattice the S-Lorenz core intersected with the region compatible with the ranking. This result uncovers a new property about the structure of the S-Lorenz core. As immediate corollaries we obtain complementary results to the findings of Dutta and Ray, Games Econ. Behav., 3(4) p. 403-422 (1991), by showing that any S-constrained egalitarian allocation is the (unique) Lorenz greatest element of the S-Lorenz core on the rank-preserving region the allocation belongs to. Besides, our results suggest that the comparison between W- and S-constrained egalitarian allocations is more puzzling than what is usually admitted in the literature.
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Lorenz criterion; Lorenz core; cooperative game; constrained egalitarian allocation; lattice;
Other versions of this item:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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