Sector-based explanation of vertical integration in distribution systems; Evidence from France
AbstractBased on recent data concerning the French distribution networks in retail and services, this paper highlights several stylized facts relating to the sector-based differences in the organizational choices. Until now this issue has not been studied in the economical literature. This paper provides an analytical framework derived from the theory of contracts, and evidence for the French case.
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Date of creation: 23 Dec 2011
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Distribution Networks; Vertical relationships; Contract theory; Applied Econometrics;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-01-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EUR-2012-01-18 (Microeconomic European Issues)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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