Presidential elections and the manipulation of exam success rate in Sub-Saharan Africa
AbstractThis paper investigates whether the exam success rate in Africa increases significantly in the months prior to the occurrence of the presidential elections. It hypothesizes that the incumbent is tempted to increase the exam success rate to retain a form of social cohesion and to 'buy' votes. A sample of 15 francophone African countries observed from 1990 to 2009 yields three findings. First, post-exam presidential elections significantly increase the exam success rate by six percentage points. Second, the manipulation of the exam success rate is positively correlated with the re-election of the incumbent. Third, these results do not hold when elections occur before the exam dates or when the incumbent or a member of his/her party do not run for the presidential seat.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00597521.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00597521/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Sub-Saharan Africa; Exam success rate; Presidential elections;
Other versions of this item:
- Mireille NTSAMA ETOUNDI & Christian EBEKE, 2011. "Presidential elections and the manipulation of exam success rate in Sub-Saharan Africa," Working Papers 201114, CERDI.
- O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2011-06-11 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-POL-2011-06-11 (Positive Political Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.