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Pourquoi les allocations chômage décroissent-elles avec la durée du chômage? Une revue de la littérature

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  • Ophélie Cerdan

    ()
    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)

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    Abstract

    Il s'agit d'une synthèse des travaux théoriques expliquant pourquoi l'indemnité chômage est décroissante avec la durée passée au chômage. Nous présentons les différents arguments en faveur de la dégressivité au sein d'une même structure théorique. Nous en distinguons trois. La dégressivité serait le profil temporel le plus adéquat pour limiter la désincitation à la recherche d'emploi. De plus, elle apparaît comme le choix politiquement attendu puisque conforme aux préférences de l'électorat majoritaire. Enfin, elle se présente comme un instrument de contrôle des abus du système. En effet, elle permet de dissuader les tricheurs ou encore ceux qui prétendent à l'indemnisation bien qu'ils ne souhaitent pas travailler.

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    File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/53/38/49/PDF/DTGREQAM2010-34.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00533849.

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    Date of creation: 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00533849

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00533849/en/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Risque moral; sélection adverse; électeur médian; recherche séquentielle d'emploi;

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    1. Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, 1990. "The Displacement Effect of Reemployment Bonus Programs," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles 90-02, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    2. Dale T. Mortensen, 1977. "Unemployment insurance and job search decisions," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 30(4), pages 505-517, July.
    3. Cahuc, Pierre & Lehmann, Etienne, 2000. "Should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 135-153, July.
    4. Holmlund, B., 1997. "Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice," CEPR Discussion Papers 380, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    5. Wright, Randall, 1986. "The redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 377-399, December.
    6. Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 2004. "Labor Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026203316x, December.
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