Search and Research: The influence of editorial boards on journals' quality

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Search and Research: The influence of editorial boards on journals' quality

Author Info

Damien Besancenot () (CEPN - Centre d'économie de l'Université de Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7115 - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII)
Joao Faria () (IPED - Institute for Policy and Economic Development - University of Texas-El Paso)
Kim Huynh () (L.E.M. - Laboratoire d'Economie Moderne - Université Paris 2)

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Abstract

This paper considers the search for the best papers by the editors of an academic journal. Editors' search is sequential. At each period, each editor receives one submission from a researcher and has to decide if she accepts or rejects the paper. The editorial board is heterogeneous, some editors being more demanding than others. On the academic side, researchers choose the quality level of their papers in order to maximize their utility function taking as given the composition of the editorial board. We show that three equilibria may occur. When the number of the less demanding editors is high, or if the editors exhibit great differences in their demand for quality, the journal will attract fewer submissions, publish a small number of papers and these papers will be of low quality. When the editorial board is composed by a homogeneous set of very demanding editors, the journal will publish a high number of high quality papers. For some intermediate structure of the board, a situation of multiple equilibria allows a hybrid equilibrium to exist in which the journal receives both good and bad papers. The long run and welfare implications of these equilibria are analyzed.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00370785_v1.

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Date of creation: 25 Mar 2009
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00370785_v1

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References listed on IDEAS
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Andrew J. Oswald, 2007. "An Examination of the Reliability of Prestigious Scholarly Journals: Evidence and Implications for Decision-Makers," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(293), pages 21-31, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Andrew J. Oswald, 2006. "An Examination of the Reliability of Prestigious Scholarly Journals: Evidence and Implications for Decision-makers," IZA Discussion Papers 2070, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Oswald, Andrew J., 2006. "An Examination of the Reliability of Prestigious Scholarly Journals: Evidence and Implications for Decision-makers," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 744, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Other versions:
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2006. "Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools Tale," ESSEC Working Papers DR 06003, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School. [Downloadable!]
Laband, David N, 1990. "Is There Value-Added from the Review Process in Economics? Preliminary Evidence from Authors," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 341-52, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Diamond, Peter, 1987. "Consumer Differences and Prices in a Search Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 429-36, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Peter Diamond, 1985. "Consumer Differences and Prices in a Search Model," Working papers 404, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Stigler, George J & Stigler, Stephen M & Friedland, Claire, 1995. "The Journals of Economics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(2), pages 331-59, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gans, Joshua S & Shepherd, George B, 1994. "How Are the Mighty Fallen: Rejected Classic Articles by Leading Economists," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 165-79, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Laband, David N & Piette, Michael J, 1994. "Favoritism versus Search for Good Papers: Empirical Evidence Regarding the Behavior of Journal Editors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 194-203, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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