Mohamed Belhaj () (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579, ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - Ecole Centrale de Marseille) Frédéric Deroïan () (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579)
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This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with possible decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on the line network. We give conditions under which more central agents provide more efforts for general payofffunctions, and we fully characterize equilibria under geometric decay.
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number
halshs-00353872_v1.
Length: Date of creation: 16 Jan 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00353872_v1
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00353872/en/ Contact details of provider: Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
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