Endogenous Efforts On Networks : Does Centrality Matter ?
AbstractThis article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with possible decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on the line network. We give conditions under which more central agents provide more efforts for general payofffunctions, and we fully characterize equilibria under geometric decay.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00353872.
Date of creation: 16 Jan 2009
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Communication Network; Endogenous Efforts; Strategic Complements;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2009-01-31 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2009-01-31 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2009-01-31 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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