This paper develops an OLG model with emissions arising from production and potential irreversible pollution. Pollution control goes through a system of permits and private agents can also maintain the environment. In this setting, we prove that there exist multiple equilibria. Due to the possible irreversibility, the economy can be dragged into both stationary and asymptotic poverty traps. First, we show that choosing a global quota on emissions at the lowest level beyond a critical threshold is a means to avoid the two types of traps. Next, we analyze the impact of a political reform on other equilibria. When the agents do not engage in maintenance, a fall in the quota implies a reduction of pollution but is detrimental to capital accumulation while, in the other case, it procures a double dividend.
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number
halshs-00352691_v1.
Length: Date of creation: 21 Mar 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00352691_v1
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