Damien Besancenot () (CEPN - Centre d'économie de l'Université de Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7115 - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII) Radu Vranceanu () (Department of Economics - ESSEC)
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This paper analyzes the decision of a migrant to return or stay within the framework of a signaling model withexogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and goodworkers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers.Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to theperfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher theincentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow.
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number
halshs-00344929_v1.
Length: Date of creation: 15 Dec 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00344929_v1
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