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Strategic Beliefs

Author

Listed:
  • Elyès Jouini

    (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Clotilde Napp

    (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We provide a discipline for beliefs formation through a model of subjective beliefs, in which agents hold incorrect but strategic beliefs. More precisely, we consider beliefs as a strategic variable that agents can manipulate to maximize their utility from trade. Our framework is therefore an imperfect competition framework, and the underlying concept is the concept of Nash equilibrium. We find that a strategic behavior leads to beliefs subjectivity and heterogeneity. Optimism (resp. overconfidence) as well as pessimism (resp. doubt) both emerge as optimal beliefs. Furthermore, we obtain a positive correlation between pessimism (resp. doubt) and risk-tolerance. The consensus belief is pessimistic and, as a consequence, the risk premium is higher than in a standard setting. Our model is embedded in a standard financial markets equilibrium problem and may be applied to several other situations in which agents have to choose the optimal exposure to a risk (choice of an optimal retention rate for an insurance company, choice of the optimal proportion of equity to retain for an entrepreneur and for a given project)

Suggested Citation

  • Elyès Jouini & Clotilde Napp, 2007. "Strategic Beliefs," Working Papers halshs-00176622, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00176622
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00176622
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    Cited by:

    1. He, Xue-Zhong & Shi, Lei, 2012. "Disagreement, correlation and asset prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 512-515.
    2. Xue‐Zhong He & Lei Shi, 2012. "Boundedly rational equilibrium and risk premium," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 52(1), pages 71-93, March.

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