Reducing the debt : is it optimal to outsource an investment?
AbstractWe deal with the problem of outsourcing the debt for a big investment, according two situations: either the firm outsources both the investment (and the associated debt) and the exploitation to a private consortium, or the firm supports the debt and the investment but outsources the exploitation. We prove the existence of Stackelberg and Nash equilibria between the firm and the private consortium, in both situations. We compare the benefits of these contracts. We conclude with a study of what happens in case of incomplete information, in the sense that the risk aversion coefficient of each partner may be unknown by the other partner.
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Date of creation: 21 May 2013
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Outsourcing; Public Debt; Public-Private-Partnership; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg equilibrium; Optimization; Stochastic control; Partial information;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-06-04 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2013-06-04 (Microeconomics)
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