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Reducing the debt : is it optimal to outsource an investment?

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  • Gilles Edouard Espinosa

    (CERMICS - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Mathématiques et Calcul Scientifique - Université Paris Est (UPE) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC))

  • Caroline Hillairet

    (CMAP - Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées - Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS : UMR7641)

  • Benjamin Jourdain

    ()
    (CERMICS - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Mathématiques et Calcul Scientifique - Université Paris Est (UPE) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt - MATHRISK - INRIA - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée (UPEMLV))

  • Monique Pontier

    (IMT - Institut de Mathématiques de Toulouse - Université Paul Sabatier (UPS) - Toulouse III - Université Toulouse le Mirail - Toulouse II - Université des Sciences Sociales - Toulouse I - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées [INSA] - Toulouse - CNRS : UMR5219)

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    Abstract

    We deal with the problem of outsourcing the debt for a big investment, according two situations: either the firm outsources both the investment (and the associated debt) and the exploitation to a private consortium, or the firm supports the debt and the investment but outsources the exploitation. We prove the existence of Stackelberg and Nash equilibria between the firm and the private consortium, in both situations. We compare the benefits of these contracts. We conclude with a study of what happens in case of incomplete information, in the sense that the risk aversion coefficient of each partner may be unknown by the other partner.

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    File URL: http://hal-enpc.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/82/43/90/PDF/Outsourcing150513.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00824390.

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    Date of creation: 21 May 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00824390

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal-enpc.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00824390
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    Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

    Related research

    Keywords: Outsourcing; Public Debt; Public-Private-Partnership; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg equilibrium; Optimization; Stochastic control; Partial information;

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    1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre, 2011. "A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts," TSE Working Papers 11-228, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2008. "Partenariats public-privé. Quelques réflexions," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 59(3), pages 437-449.
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