Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Welfare Analysis in Games with substitutabilities

Contents:

Author Info

  • Yann Rébillé

    ()
    (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - Université de Nantes : EA4272)

  • Lionel Richefort

    ()
    (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - Université de Nantes : EA4272)

Abstract

This paper investigates the social optimum in network games of strategic substitutes and identifies how network structure shapes optimal policies. First, we show that the socially optimal profile is ob-tained through a combination of two opposite network effects, generated by the incoming and the outgoing weighted Bonacich centrality measures. Next, three different policies that restore the social optimum are derived, and the implications of the predecessor(s)-successor(s) relationship between the agents on each policy instrument are explored. Then, the link between optimal taxes and the density of the network is established.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/73/29/50/PDF/LEMNA_WP_201238.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00732950.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 17 Sep 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00732950

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00732950
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

Related research

Keywords: network game ; social optimum ; Bonacich centrality ; opti- mal policy ; spectral radius.;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Nizar Allouch, 2013. "The Cost of Segregation in Social Networks," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2013.52, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Yann Rébillé & Lionel Richefort, 2014. "Influence and Social Tragedy in Networks," Working Papers hal-00924017, HAL.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00732950. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.