Analogies and Theories: The Role of Simplicity and the Emergence of Norms
AbstractWe consider the dynamics of reasoning by general rules (theories) and specific cases (analogies). When an agent faces an exogenous process, we show that, under mild conditions, if reality happens to be simple, the agent will converge to adopt a theory and discard analogical thinking. If, however, reality is complex, the agent may rely on analogies more than on theories. By contrast, when the process is generated by agents' predictions, convergence to a theory is much more likely, as in the emergence of norms in a coordination game. Mixed cases, involving noisy endogenous processes are likely to give rise to complex dynamics of reasoning, switching between theories and analogies.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00712917.
Date of creation: 28 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00712917
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
analogies; theories; simplicity; norms;
Other versions of this item:
- Gayer, Gabrielle & Gilboa, Itzhak, 2014. "Analogies and theories: The role of simplicity and the emergence of norms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 267-283.
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-07-14 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2012-07-14 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-07-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-07-14 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-07-14 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gilboa,Itzhak & Schmeidler,David, 2001.
"A Theory of Case-Based Decisions,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521802345, Fall.
- Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium,"
925, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- E. Kalai & E. Lehrer, 2010. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 529, David K. Levine.
- Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 895, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Gilboa, I. & Schmeidler, D., 1999.
"Inductive Inference: an Axiomatic Approach,"
29-99, Tel Aviv.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 2002. "Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000544, www.najecon.org.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 2001. "Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1339, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 2002. "Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000544, David K. Levine.
- Gilboa, I. & Schmeidler, D., 2001. "Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach," Papers 2001-19, Tel Aviv.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.