Optimal transport and Cournot-Nash equilibria
AbstractWe study a class of games with a continuum of players for which Cournot-Nash equilibria can be obtained by the minimisation of some cost, related to optimal transport. This cost is not convex in the usual sense in general but it turns out to have hidden strict convexity properties in many relevant cases. This enables us to obtain new uniqueness results and a characterisation of equilibria in terms of some partial differential equations, a simple numerical scheme in dimension one as well as an analysis of the inefficiency of equilibria.
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Date of creation: 25 Jun 2012
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Cournot-Nash equilibria ; mean-field games ; optimal transport ; externalities ; Monge-Amp\ère equations ; convexity along generalised geodesics;
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-07-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-TRE-2012-07-08 (Transport Economics)
- NEP-URE-2012-07-08 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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