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Coalitional Equilibria of Strategic Games

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Author Info
Rida Laraki (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)
Abstract

Let N be a set of players, C the set of permissible coalitions and G an N-playerstrategic game. A profile is a coalitional-equilibrium if no coalition permissible coalition in C has a unilateral deviation that profits to all its members. Nash-equilibria consider only single player coalitions and Aumann strong-equilibria permit all coalitions to deviate. A new fixed point theorem allows to obtain a condition for the existence of coalitional equilibria that covers Glicksberg for the existence of Nash-equilibria and is related to Ichiishi's condition for the existence of Aumann strong-equilibria.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00429293_v1.

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Date of creation: 02 Nov 2009
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00429293_v1

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Related research
Keywords: Fixed point theorems; maximum of non-transitive preferences; Nash and strong equilibria; coalitional equilibria;

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  1. Gale, D. & Mas-Colell, A., 1975. "An equilibrium existence theorem for a general model without ordered preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 9-15, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-19.

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