Coalitional Equilibria of Strategic Games
AbstractLet N be a set of players, C the set of permissible coalitions and G an N-playerstrategic game. A profile is a coalitional-equilibrium if no coalition permissible coalition in C has a unilateral deviation that profits to all its members. Nash-equilibria consider only single player coalitions and Aumann strong-equilibria permit all coalitions to deviate. A new fixed point theorem allows to obtain a condition for the existence of coalitional equilibria that covers Glicksberg for the existence of Nash-equilibria and is related to Ichiishi's condition for the existence of Aumann strong-equilibria.
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Date of creation: 02 Nov 2009
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Fixed point theorems; maximum of non-transitive preferences; Nash and strong equilibria; coalitional equilibria;
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- Gale, D. & Mas-Colell, A., 1975. "An equilibrium existence theorem for a general model without ordered preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 9-15, March.
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