Fair Trade Contracts for Some, an Insurance for Others
AbstractThis article analyzes the impact of Fair Trade contracts between sub-groups of farmers and a Fair Trade organization on the spot market price. We analyze a three level vertical chain gathering perfectly competitive farmers upstream who offer their raw product on a spot market to manufacturers who then sell finished products to a downstream retailer. Absent Fair Trade, the entire raw product is sold on the spot market. When a Fair Trade organization offers a Fair Trade contract to a sub-group of farmers, it gathers a Guaranteed Minimum Price clause and a straight relationship between the sub-group of farmers and the retailer. This article highlights several conditions such that a snowball effect exists, i.e farmers outside of the Fair Trade contract also benefit from a higher spot market price.
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Date of creation: 11 Mar 2009
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Guaranteed Minimum Price Contracts; Disintermediation; Fair Trade; Vertical Chain; Two-part Tariff Contracts;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2009-03-22 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-03-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IAS-2009-03-22 (Insurance Economics)
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