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Markovian assignment rules

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Author Info
Francis Bloch (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)
David Cantala (El Colegio de Mexico - El Colegio de México)

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Abstract

We analyze dynamic assignment problems where agents successively receive different objects (positions, offices, etc.). A finite set of n vertically differentiated indivisible objects are assigned to n agents who live n periods. At each period, a new agent enters society, and the oldest agent retires, leaving his object to be reassigned. We define independent assignment rules (where the assignment of an object to an agent is independent of the way other objects are allocated to other agents), efficient assignment rules (where there does not exist another assignment rule with larger expected surplus), and fair assignment rules (where agents experiencing the same circumstances have identical histories in the long run). When agents are homogenous, we characterize efficient, independent and fair rules as generalizations of the seniority rule. When agents draw their types at random, we prove that independence and efficiency are incompatible, and that efficient and fair rules only exist when there are two types of agents. We characterize two simple rules (type-rank and type-seniority) which satisfy both efficiency and fairness criteria in dichotomous settings.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00356304_v1.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Related research
Keywords: dynamic assignment; finite Markov chains; seniority; promotion rules;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lakshmi Iyer, 2008. "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India," Working Papers id:1781, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
  2. Cantala, David, 2004. "Restabilizing matching markets at senior level," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-17, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Blum, Yosef & Roth, Alvin E. & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1997. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 362-411, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. David Cantala & Francisco Sánchez, 2008. "Welfare and stability in senior matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 369-392, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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