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Cycles of cooperation and free-riding in social systems

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Author Info
Yiping Ma (TIMC - Techniques de l’Ingénierie Médicale et de la Complexité - CNRS : UMR5525 - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble I)
Sebastian Gonçalves (TIMC - Techniques de l’Ingénierie Médicale et de la Complexité - CNRS : UMR5525 - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble I, Instituto de Fisica, UFRGS - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul)
Sylvain Mignot (TIMC - Techniques de l’Ingénierie Médicale et de la Complexité - CNRS : UMR5525 - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble I)
Jean-Pierre Nadal (LPS - Laboratoire de Physique Statistique de l'ENS - CNRS : UMR8550 - Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris VI - Université Denis Diderot - Paris VII - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris, CAMS - Centre d'analyse et de mathématique sociale - CNRS : UMR8557 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales)
Mirta B. Gordon (TIMC - Techniques de l’Ingénierie Médicale et de la Complexité - CNRS : UMR5525 - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble I)

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Abstract

Basic evidences on non-profit making and other forms of benevolent-based organizations reveal a rough partition of members between somepure consumers of the public good (free-riders) and benevolent individuals (cooperators). We study the relationship between the community size and the level of cooperation in a simple model where the utility of joining the community is proportional to its size. We assume an idiosyncratic willingness to join the community ; cooperation bears a fixed cost while free-riding bears a (moral) idiosyncratic cost proportional to the fraction of cooperators. We show that the system presents two types of equilibria: fixed points (Nash equilibria) with a mixture of cooperators and free-riders and cycles where the size of the community, as well as the proportion of cooperators and free-riders, vary periodically.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00349642_v1.

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Date of creation: 02 Jan 2009
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00349642_v1

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2003. "Altruistic Punishment in Humans," Microeconomics 0305006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mirta B. Gordon & Jean-Pierre Nadal & Denis Phan & Viktoriya Semeshenko, 2007. "Discrete Choices under Social Influence: Generic Properties," Working Papers halshs-00135405_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  3. Greiner, Ben & Vittoria Levati, M., 2005. "Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 711-731, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Jean-Pierre Nadal & Denis Phan∥ & Mirta B. Gordon & Jean Vannimenus, 2005. "Multiple equilibria in a monopoly market with heterogeneous agents and externalities," Quantitative Finance, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 5(6), pages 557-568, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Walid Hichri & Alan Kirman, 2007. "The Emergence of Coordination in Public Good Games," Post-Print halshs-00161572_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation," Macroeconomics 0409026, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 1999. "Collective action as a social exchange," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 341-369, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.


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