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Natural disaster insurance and the equity-efficiency trade-off

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Author Info
Pierre Picard (LEEP - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

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Abstract

Cet article analyse le rôle de l'assurance privée dans la prévention et la réduction des dommages des catastrophes naturelles. Nous caractérisons le dilemme équité-efficacité auquel sont confrontés les décideurs politiques dans un contexte d'information imparfaite sur les coûts individuels de prévention. Il est montré qu'un marché concurrentiel d'assurance avec une tarification actuarielle, associé à des transferts sous forme de taxe ou de subvention, domine vraisemblablement les règles de tarification uniforme de l'assurance ou les schémas d'indemnisation financée par l'Etat. Le modèle montre comment des taxes différentiées sur les contrats d'assurance peuvent accroître les incitations à la prévention, tout en faisant bénéficier d'un transfert compensateur les individus dont les coûts de prévention sont élevés. L'article met aussi l'accent sur la complémentarité entre les incitations individuelles par la fiscalité et les incitations collectives par l'attribution de subventions aux collectivités locales qui mettent en place des politiques de prévention des risques de catastrophes naturelle

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00243028_v1.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243028_v1

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Browne, Mark J & Hoyt, Robert E, 2000. " The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 291-306, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kunreuther, Howard, 1996. "Mitigating Disaster Losses through Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 12(2-3), pages 171-87, May.
  3. Lewis, Tracy & Nickerson, David, 1989. "Self-insurance against natural disasters," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 209-223, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Gilberto Turati & Luigi Buzzacchi, 2009. "Optimal risk allocation in the provision of local public services: can a private insurer be better than a public mutual fund?," Working Papers 2009/21, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB). [Downloadable!]
  2. Luigi Buzzacchi & Gilberto Turati, 2009. "Collective Risks in Local Administrations: Can a Private Insurer Be Better than a Public Mutual Fund?," Working Papers 3, University of Torino, Department of Economics and Public Finance "G. Prato". [Downloadable!]
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