This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Philippe Mongin (LEEP - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

La théorie de l'agrégation logique a récemment établi le résultat d'impossibilité suivant: toute fonction de jugement social non-constante qui satisfait l'indépendance des options non pertinentes est dictatoriale. Comme cette dernière condition paraît difficilement acceptable, on la remplace par une condition plus faible en lui adjoignant une condition d'unanimité de type parétien. Le théorème obtenu se rapproche de celui d'Arrow et se présente comme plus authentiquement paradoxal que le théorème d'impossibilité d'origine.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/24/30/10/PDF/2005-08-04-1146.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00243010_v1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243010_v1

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00243010/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (CCSD).

Related research
Keywords: Agrégation logique; Fonction de jugement social; Indépendance des options non-pertinentes;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Samuelson, Paul A, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 44(173), pages 81-88, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2004. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," Public Economics 0404007, EconWPA, revised 25 Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Klaus Nehring, 2005. "The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational," Economics Working Papers 0068, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Franz Dietrich, 2007. "A generalised model of judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 529-565, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Elad Dokow & Ron Holzman, 2009. "Aggregation of binary evaluations for truth-functional agendas," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 221-241, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dietrich, Franz & Mongin Philippe, 2008. "The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation," Research Memoranda 013, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  4. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2008. "Judgment aggregation without full rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 15-39, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Klaus Nehring & Clemens Puppe, 2008. "Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 41-57, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Klaus Nehring, 2005. "The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational," Economics Working Papers 0068, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer with RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-10.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.