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Evaluation approfondie du plan français d'affectation de quotas de CO2 aux entreprises

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  • Olivier Godard

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Having in view the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (1997) limiting greenhouse gas emissions, European Authorities have set up a European market of CO2 emission quotas for big emitters of industrial and energy sectors. This market is supposed to be operational since January 2005. Meanwhile, each member state, not the Commission, had to choose the level of the national emissions ceiling for this instrument and the rules for allocating quotas to existing and new facilities. The paper presents an assessment of the French final plan, as accepted in December 2004 by the European Commission after several adjustments of the initial plan. It considers both overall quantities affected and impacts of rules of the game on incentives given to business. As a result, choices made by the French government express a will to protect national industry and energy producers rather than to set appropriate economic incentives for an efficient and strong system in line with Kyoto commitments.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Godard, 2005. "Evaluation approfondie du plan français d'affectation de quotas de CO2 aux entreprises," Working Papers hal-00243005, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243005
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00243005
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    Cited by:

    1. Clémence Christin & Jean-Philippe Nicolai & Jerome Pouyet, 2013. "Pollution Permits, Imperfect Competition and Abatement Technologies," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 13/186, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    2. Christin, Clémence & Nicolai, Jean-Philippe & Pouyet, Jerome, 2011. "The role of abatement technologies for allocating free allowances," DICE Discussion Papers 34, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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