Geometry, Correlated Equilibria and Zero-Sum Games

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Geometry, Correlated Equilibria and Zero-Sum Games

Author Info

Yannick Viossat (LEEP - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

Abstract

Ce papier porte à la fois sur la géométrie des équilibres de Nash et des équilibres corrélés et sur une généralisation des jeux à sommes nulles fondée sur les équilibres corrélés. L'ensemble des distributions d'équilibres corrélés de n'importe quel jeu fini est un polytope, qui contient les équilibres de Nash. Je caractérise la classe des jeux tels que ce polytope (s'il ne se réduit pas à un singleton) contienne un équilibre de Nash dans son intérieur relatif. Bien que cette classe de jeux ne soit pas définie par une propriété d'antagonisme entre les joueurs, je montre qu'elle inclut et qu'elle généralise la classe des jeux à deux joueurs et à somme nulle.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00242993_v1.

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Date of creation: 2003
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References listed on IDEAS
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Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Other versions:
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Other versions:
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Cripps, Martin, 1991. "Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 428-434, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Other versions:
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Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2003. "Regret-based continuous-time dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 375-394, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2001. "Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics," Discussion Paper Series dp309, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Apr 2003. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Michael Chwe, 2006. "Statistical Game Theory," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000004, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.

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