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Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching

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Author Info
Dipjyoti Majumdar (LEEP - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)
Abstract

Nous étudions des questions d'incitation dans le cadre des problèmes de marriage, en remplassant la notion de non-manipulabilité par celle de Compatibilité Incitative Bayésienne Ordinale (OBIC). Cette condition exige que dire la vérité maximise l'utilité espérée calculée par rapport à la loi a priori de chaque agent et sous l'hypothèse que les autres agents disent la vérité. Nous montrons que, sans restriction sur les préférences, il n'existe aucune procédure stable et OBIC. On suppose ensuite que les préférences sont telles que rester célibataire est la pire option pour chaque agent. Dans ce cas, si les probabilités a priori sont uniformes, les mariages générés par les algorithmes d'acceptation différée sont OBIC. Cependant, pour des lois a priori génériques, il n'existe pas de procédures stables et OBIC, même pour des préférences restreintes.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00242988_v1.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Keywords: Marriage stable; Incitation; Manipulabilité;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Roth, Alvin E., 1989. "Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 191-209, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 417-35, May.
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  3. dÕASPREMONT, C. & PELEG, B., 1986. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees," CORE Discussion Papers 1986042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Ehlers, Lars, 2004. "In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 249-270, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1991. "Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 31-44, January.
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Cited by:
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  1. Joana Pais, 2008. "Random matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 99-116, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Joana Pais, 2006. "Incentives in Decentralized Random Matching Markets," Working Papers 2006/12, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.. [Downloadable!]
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