Political equilibrium with private or / and public campaign finance : A comparison of institutions

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Political equilibrium with private or / and public campaign finance : A comparison of institutions

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John Roemer (Yale University -)

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John Roemer

Abstract

Nous proposons une théorie de la politique (deux partis, une seule question) dans laquelle les citoyens deviennent membre d'un parti en le financant et dans laquelle l'influence d'un de ses membres sur la politique proposée par le parti est proportionnelle à sa contribution. L'électorat est constitué de votants informés et non-informés: Seuls les votants informés rejoignent les partis, et le budget de campagne d'un parti, la somme des contributions qu'il reçoit, est utilisé pour communiquer en direction des votants non-informés. Les partis sont en compétition stratégique par rapport à leur choix politique et leur communication. On propose une définition de l'équilibre politique dans laquelle l'appartenance partisane, les contributions et les politiques sont déterminées simultanément, pour quatre modes institutionnels de financement, allant d'un système non contraint purement privé à un système public dans lequel tous les citoyens ont le même impact financier. On compare les qualités des quatre systèmes en termes de représentation et de bien-être.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00242958_v1.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Paper
- John E. Roemer, 2003. "Political Equilibrium With Private or/and Public Campaign Finance: A Comparison Of Institutions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1409, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
- John E. Roemer, 2004. "Political Equilibrium with Private or/and Public Campaign Finance: A Comparison of Institutions," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm349, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
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Christoph Vanberg, 2005. "“One Man, One Dollar”? Examining the equalization argument in support of campaign contribution limits," Public Economics 0512001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Christoph Vanberg, 2005. ""One Man, One Dollar"? Examining the equalization argument in support of campaign contribution limits," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-31, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]

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