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Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy

Author

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  • Andreea Cosnita

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Philippe Tropeano

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

This paper deals with the optimal enforcement of competition law between merger and anti-cartel policies. We examine the interaction between these two branches of antitrust, given the budget constraint of the public agency, and taking into account the ensuing incentives for firms in terms of choice between cartels and mergers. To the extent that a tougher anti-cartel action triggers more mergers and vice-versa, we show that the two antitrust branches are complementary. However, if the merger's coordinated effect is taken into account, then for a sufficiently large such effect the agency may optimally have to refrain from controlling mergers and instead spend all resources on fighting cartels.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreea Cosnita & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2013. "Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00977619, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-00977619
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.10.002
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00977619
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, October.
    2. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    3. Lars Sørgard, 2009. "Optimal Merger Policy: Enforcement Vs. Deterrence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 438-456, September.
    4. Cécile Aubert & Jérôme Pouyet, 2004. "Competition policy, regulation and the institutional design of industry supervision," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(2), pages 153-168.
    5. Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    6. Simon J. Evenett & Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2001. "International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(9), pages 1221-1245, September.
    7. Bittlingmayer, George, 1985. "Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 77-118, April.
    8. Dennis Mueller, 1996. "Antimerger policy in the United States: History and lessons," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 229-253, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tim Reuter, 2017. "Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(3), pages 291-313, November.
    2. Pedro P. Barros & Steffen Hoernig & Tore Nilssen, 2015. "Transversal Agency and Crowding Out," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 589-608, December.
    3. Boris Begović & Dušan Popović, 2019. "Merger Control and Economic Growth of LDCs: Some Observations and Recommendations," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 381-408, March.
    4. Koski, Heli & Pajarinen, Mika, 2013. "Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Competition Policy," ETLA Working Papers 15, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    5. Hüschelrath, Kai & Smuda, Florian, 2013. "Do cartel breakdowns induce mergers? Evidence from EC cartel cases," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-036, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Stephen Davies & Peter L. Ormosi & Martin Graffenberger, 2014. "Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel breakdown," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2014-01, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    7. Filomena Garcia & Jose Manuel Paz y Miño & Gustavo Torrens, 2020. "The merger paradox, collusion, and competition policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(6), pages 2051-2081, December.
    8. Stephen Davies & Peter Ormosi & Martin Graffenberger, 2015. "Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel breakdown," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
    9. Robert M. Feinberg, 2016. "Anti-cartel enforcement and subsequent mergers: state-level evidence for physician groups," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(1), pages 365-372.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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