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WHY BUSINESS SCHOOLS DO SO MUCH RESEARCH:
A SIGNALING EXPLANATION

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Author Info
Damien Besancenot () (CEPN - Centre d'économie de l'Université de Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7115 - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII)
Joao Faria () (Department of Economics - Nottingham Business School)
Radu Vranceanu () (Department of Economics - ESSEC)

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Abstract

Criticism is mounting on business schools for their excessive focus on research and for neglecting teaching. We show that if students have imperfect information about a school's overall capabilities and if business schools differ in their research productivity, the least productive schools may do as much research as the top-tier ones only to manipulate students' expectations. In turn, the most productive schools might resort to excess research in order to signal their type in the eyes of future students. This signaling equilibrium is characterized by a relative neglect of teaching by the top-tier schools. Such a situation is socially inefficient as compared to the perfect information case.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Pre- and Post-Print documents with number halshs-00241259_v1.

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Date of creation: 17 Jan 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00241259_v1

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Related research
Keywords: Business Schools Research management Research policy Research vs. teaching Signalling Imperfect information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Elizabeth Becker & Cotton M. Lindsay & Gary Grizzle, 2003. "The derived demand for faculty research," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(8), pages 549-567. [Downloadable!]
  2. Michael Spence, 2002. "Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 434-459, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-6-15.

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