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Protections des actionnaires et bénéfices privés : doit-on aller plus loin que la Loi ?

Author

Listed:
  • Christian At

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Lionel Thomas

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Nathalie Chappe

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Pierre-Henri Morand

Abstract

Cet article examine les contrats de r ́emun ́eration optimaux des dirigeants lorsque les actionnaires ont la possibilit ́e de renforcer leur protection par rapport au niveau de protection garanti par la loi. Le contrat optimal est compos ́e de trois instru- ments : le salaire, le montant de dividendes (implicitement ́equivalent au montant d ́etourn ́e) et le niveau de protection priv ́ee en sus de la protection l ́egale. En situa- tion d'asym ́etrie d'information, ces trois instruments sont utilis ́es dans le contrat optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian At & Lionel Thomas & Nathalie Chappe & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2007. "Protections des actionnaires et bénéfices privés : doit-on aller plus loin que la Loi ?," Post-Print halshs-01309091, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01309091
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    Keywords

    b ́en ́efices priv ́es; contrat optimal; incitations; gouvernance d’entreprise; protection des actionnaires;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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