Political Ideology and Economic Growth in a Democracy : The French Experience, 1871 - 2009
AbstractThis paper examines the influence of political ideology on economic growth in the French democracy since 1871. It does so by addressing three main issues : the property and the reliability of a political ideology index in the long-run, the robustness of the relationship between ideology and growth and the specific channels through which political ideology affects economic performance. The main conclusion is that, compared with right-wing parties in power, left-wing governments have promoted equity at the expense of economic growth. It also appears that the main channel through which political ideology has impacted economic performance all along the French democratic experience is the budgetary tool (i.e. fiscal and redistributive policies) which influenced employment and income inequalities. By contrast, there seems to be less or even no empirical support for explanations based on the monetary policy or regulation, such as trade policies or the labor market regulation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00662838.
Date of creation: Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00662838
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
French economic history; 19th century; 20th century; political ideology; partisanship; growth; government performance; fiscal policy; public spending; unemployment; inequality.;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1993.
"Is Inequality Harmful for Growth,"
537, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Pushan Dutt & Devashish Mitra, 2002.
"Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation,"
NBER Working Papers
9239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pushan Dutt & Devashish Mitra, 2005. "Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(1), pages 59-72, February.
- Reed, W. Robert, 2006. "Democrats, republicans, and taxes: Evidence that political parties matter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 725-750, May.
- Rodrik, Dani & Alesina, Alberto, 1994.
"Distributive Politics and Economic Growth,"
4551798, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Nijkamp, Peter & Poot, Jacques, 2004. "Meta-analysis of the effect of fiscal policies on long-run growth," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 91-124, March.
- Tavares, Jose, 2004.
"Does right or left matter? Cabinets, credibility and fiscal adjustments,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2447-2468, December.
- Jose Tavares, 2000. "Does Right or Left Matter? Cabinets, Credibility and Fiscal Adjustments," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1548, Econometric Society.
- Barro, Robert J, 2000. " Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 5-32, March.
- Reinhart, Vincent Raymond, 1999. "Death and taxes: their implications for endogenous growth," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 339-345, March.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
- Robert J. Barro, 1999. "Inequality, Growth, and Investment," NBER Working Papers 7038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wagner, Richard E, 1977. "Economic Manipulation for Political Profit: Macroeconomic Consequences and Constitutional Implications," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 395-410.
- Mo, Pak Hung, 2001. "Corruption and Economic Growth," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 66-79, March.
- Padovano, Fabio & Galli, Emma, 2001. "Tax Rates and Economic Growth in the OECD Countries (1950-1990)," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(1), pages 44-57, January.
- Lee, Jim, 2000. "The Robustness of Okun's Law: Evidence from OECD Countries," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 331-356, April.
- Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
- Assaf Razin & Chi-Wa Yuen, 1996.
"Capital Income Taxation and Long Run Growth: New Perspectives,"
NBER Working Papers
5028, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Razin, Assaf & Yuen, Chi-Wa, 1996. "Capital income taxation and long-run growth: New perspectives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 239-263, February.
- Asea, Patrick & Mendoza, Enrique G & Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 1996.
"On the Ineffectiveness of Tax Policy in Altering Long- Run Growth: Harberger's Superneutrality Conjecture,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1378, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mendoza, Enrique G. & Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria & Asea, Patrick, 1997. "On the ineffectiveness of tax policy in altering long-run growth: Harberger's superneutrality conjecture," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 99-126, October.
- Kneller, Richard & Bleaney, Michael F. & Gemmell, Norman, 1999. "Fiscal policy and growth: evidence from OECD countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 171-190, November.
- John Patty & Roberto Weber, 2007. "Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 293-310, March.
- Beck, T.H.L. & Clarke, G. & Groff, A. & Keefer , P. & Walsh, P., 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125517, Tilburg University.
- Markussen, Simen, 2008. "How the left prospers from prosperity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 329-342, June.
- Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, January.
- Lee, Young & Gordon, Roger H., 2005. "Tax structure and economic growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 1027-1043, June.
- Osang, Thomas & Pereira, Alfredo, 1996. "Import tariffs and growth in a small open economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 45-71, April.
- Zhang, Jie, 1995. "Social security and endogenous growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 185-213, October.
- Horst Siebert, 1997. "Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in Europe," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 37-54, Summer.
- Terraza, Michel & Bourbonnais, Régis, 2010. "Analyse de séries temporelles : applications à l’économie et à la gestion," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/7451, Paris Dauphine University.
- David H. Romer & Jeffrey A. Frankel, 1999. "Does Trade Cause Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 379-399, June.
- Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-84, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.