Introduction to the special issue Special issue on Behavioral Public Economics
AbstractThe workshop of the Association for Public Economic Theory on behavioral and experimental public economics was held at Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon, Universite de Lyon, from June 24 to June 26, 2008. Thirty papers were presented in addition to keynotes by Charlie Plott and John List. The focus of the workshop was to test theoretical models using experimental methods to increase our understanding of the efficiency of mechanisms supporting the provision of public goods, social cooperation, and voting systems. This special issue aims at showing how lively and diversified the ongoing experimental research in public economics has come to be. We highlight three topics in particular: the power of voting and legal enforcement systems, the efficiency of various institutions to support cooperation in social dilemma games, and auctions.
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Date of creation: 2011
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Publication status: Published, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2011, 13, 5, pp. 631-637
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Behavioral Public Economics;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-02-01 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2012-02-01 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-02-01 (Experimental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daniel Houser & Erte Xiao & Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, 2005.
"When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non- cooperation,"
- Houser, Daniel & Xiao, Erte & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon, 2008. "When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 509-532, March.
- Daniel Houser & Erte Xiao & Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, 2005. "When Punishment Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions and Non- Cooperation," Experimental 0502001, EconWPA, revised 18 Feb 2005.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert‐Vincent Joule & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2011.
"Do People Always Pay Less Than They Say? Testbed Laboratory Experiments with IV and HG Values,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 857-882, October.
- Jacquemet, Nicolas & Joule, Robert-Vincent & Luchini, Stéphane & Shogren, Jason F., 2011. "Do People Always Pay Less Than They Say? Testbed Laboratory Experiments With IV and HG Values," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/9717, Paris Dauphine University.
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